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I. INTRODUCTION
Two sixteen-year-old sweethearts in Florida have con-sensual sex and memorialize it in a photo that they share only with each other.A slightly drunk seventeen-year-old in New 
York has oral sex with another moderately inebriated seven-
teen-year-old at a party. He takes a photo of the act with his cell 
phone and sends his trophy to his cousin in Ohio.
A fifteen-year-old girl in Nebraska removes her clothes 
while talking to her eighteen-year-old boyfriend on Skype, hop-
ing it makes him “hot” for her.
A sixteen-year-old Oregonian youth takes a picture of his 
erect penis next to some referential object because, well, he can.
Only one of these scenarios depicts unlawful conduct that 
will subject its actor(s) to felony 
child pornography charges that 
carry mandatory sex offender reg-
istration requirements for at least 
ten years; it is the first scenario, 
which is arguably the most benign. 
Though every state has criminal-
ized what we consider as child 
pornography, the individual state 
proscriptions of these depictions 
have resulted in a dysfunctional 
system of law enforcement where 
there is uncertainty as to what and 
whom we are trying to regulate. 
As a consequence, many young people are unaware that their 
conduct may be a crime. Nationally, legal action has been pro-
longed, inconsistent, and the subject of much literature.1
Typical child porn legislation forbids anyone to create, 
record, photograph, film, develop, reproduce, or publish any 
material that depicts a minor in a state of nudity or engaging 
in certain explicit sexual acts.2 Though this material has been 
described as “self-exploitation,”3 or “autopornography.”4 those 
words describe the method of production and do not create a 
requirement that the person creating the photo actually be the 
subject of the image.
Most of this literature has considered the phenomenon of 
“sexting,” a portmanteau combining “sex” and “text,” which 
describes the act of taking a sexually explicit or suggestive 
photo, most often by cell phone camera, and then transmitting 
the image via the text message feature that is offered as part of 
the service plan. Commentator Yvonne Roberts is credited with 
the first use of the term in an article in 2005, though that story 
had nothing to do with juveniles.5
The scope of this Article envisions a not too distant future 
in which sexting is only one method, and not the predominate 
method, of how images will be created and shared among young 
people. It was until recently that online chats with webcams 
were replaced by the cell phone as the primary means of cre-
ation and distribution of these images. Now websites like Cha-
tRoulette6 provide the forum for random exhibitionism with 
strangers. Soon applications such as FaceTime7 will replace 
sexting and be the standard feature to create real time streamed 
images from a hand held device such as the iPhone. Whereas a 
sexted image can easily be saved 
on the device, and Skyped or Web-
cam images can be anticipated and 
recorded, new technology is mak-
ing it far more difficult to discover 
the material and prove criminal li-
ability arising out of its existence.8 
Yet all of this material, when it 
depicts lewd images of minors, is 
subject to traditional child pornog-
raphy prohibitions that criminalize 
all aspects of the creation, posses-
sion, and transmission of material 
that contains sexual depictions of people under a specified age.9 
Though celebrity sexting keeps it at the forefront of the public 
interest, this Article addresses a greater scope of activity than 
sexting.
Prosecutions for the creation and distribution of explicit 
images of minors have often resulted in drastic punishments 
with enduring sexual registration requirements, and thus are 
often litigated through state and federal courts in an effort to 
clear names and restore reputations.10 Some offenders are of-
fered diversion programs and other non-formalized resolu-
tions.11 Several writers argue this production of e-porn between 
consenting juveniles is not an unlawful act.12
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This Article contributes an important and timely analysis 
of the increased tension between the First Amendment and 
technological innovation, especially as recent Supreme Court 
decisions have reinforced the protection against Government 
regulation of speech and expression. This analysis is imperative 
for our understanding of the limitations of current approaches to 
a phenomenon made possible by seemingly limitless methods 
of creation and transmission. A number of States have enacted, 
or are considering, legislation that accepts the self-made im-
ages from enforcement under the traditional child pornography 
statutes.13 Some legislation creates affirmative defenses to child 
porn prosecution where the circumstances clearly depart from 
exploitation and abuse.14 Through examining judicial decisions 
and legislation, a new standard should be considered when 
consensual and non-exploitative conduct poses a legitimate 
basis for criminalization. This measure creates a safe haven for 
depictions of conduct that is lawful for the engaged subject, 
even when those images contain explicit sexuality; criminality 
will instead be predicated upon the use or intended use of the 
material.
Parts I and II of this Article introduce the reader to the 
nature of the problem and why it matters that we address the 
First Amendment implications upon the status quo which allows 
for severe sanctions to be imposed upon immature people who 
often have no idea that they are breaking any laws, and who are 
showing no inclination to abandon this mode of communica-
tion. A consideration of existing statutes reveal a pastiche of 
laws that often criminalize the depiction of lawful conduct, and 
are anchored by the chronological age of the actors, making dis-
tinctions often where there are no differences in the behavior of 
the actors, but are of enormous consequences to the participants. 
The examples at the beginning of this section are but four of 
many fact patterns that can result in the discordant application 
of law when any one of the numerous methods of creation and 
transmission depict erotica involving teens.
Part III of this Article will attempt to quantify the numbers 
of young people who are impacted by this discussion. It will 
identify the significant number of teens who use cell phones 
and send sexually explicit texts. When added to the number of 
computer users overall, it becomes obvious that child pornogra-
phy laws or new legislation focused on texting already impacts 
a great deal of young people.15 This section will conclude with 
a survey of the “legal age” to have sex in each state, since that 
is the definitive metric in the proposals made in this Article.
Part IV considers the conception of child pornography 
jurisprudence in the Supreme Court of the United States and 
demonstrates how two recent First Amendment cases will re-
quire legislative policymakers to discern between creation and 
transmission of sexually explicit material that is intrinsic to a 
criminal act and similar material that possesses some intrinsic 
social value. No doubt the weightiest of these opinions is United 
States v. Stevens,16 which affirms limitations on content-based 
censorship, and has been said to be the most important First 
Amendment opinion in a decade.17 More recently, Brown v En-
tertainment Merchants Association18 amplified the significant 
First Amendment protection bestowed upon minors when they 
create, distribute, or consume speech.19
Part V will explain why consensual and non-exploitive 
sexting and Skyping20 do not result in the risks of harm to chil-
dren that justify the pervasive use of child pornography laws to 
regulate the sexual expressions of juveniles. Much of the early 
literature is directed toward connecting sexting with traditional 
child porn because both harm children.21 This Article discounts 
these arguments and returns the focus to the original intent of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, which established the basis for 
excluding child pornography from the umbrella of First Amend-
ment protection.
Part VI creates a boundary within which a significant 
amount of sexually oriented speech and expression would be 
shielded from prosecution. This portion argues that lawfully 
created, explicit imagery should not be criminalized unless it is 
used in violation of existing law or is itself integral to criminal 
conduct. The fact that in many states it is lawful to engage in 
sexual conduct with someone while the possession of a nude 
photograph of that person is unlawful reflects societal confusion 
in sexual matters.
This section identifies a number of criminal offenses in 
which the explicit material is proximately linked to the pro-
hibited act. The most generic prohibition against the creation, 
possession, or distribution of child porn would be a statute that 
contains a mens rea requirement that the actor subjectively be-
lieve the material to be child pornography. More specific are 
a number of statutes that can be engaged when someone cre-
ates, possesses, or distributes this matter with the intent to stalk, 
harass, menace, or injure the reputation of another. Likewise, 
prosecutions should occur when the material is used to black-
mail or extort from, when used for commercial purposes, or 
when used to entice another to do an unlawful act. The pros-
ecuting attorney is in the best position to apply these nuanced 
laws to fact patterns so that formal prosecution is predicated 
upon admissible evidence that sufficiently proves the elements 
of the offense.
Part VII concludes that technology has outgrown con-
ceptual child pornography jurisprudence, but not traditional 
First Amendment values. A number of statutes contain condi-
tions that provide young people with affirmative defenses to 
charges, or which reduce potential penalties for those who do 
sext.22 Whether sui generis or the amendment of existing laws, 
or through evolving jurisprudence, these efforts are laying the 
groundwork for a legislative or a judicial distinction between 
creating porn and sexting.
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II. THE DYSFUNCTION OF CURRENT  
LAW AND POLICY
Two factors account for the disconnect between the use of 
traditional child pornography prosecution and the regulation of 
teen behavior. First, there is no consensus among legislatures 
as to what or who should be regulated. Second, as discussed in 
Part IV, though the compelling interest in child safety is axiom-
atic, those interests, as defined by the Supreme Court, are not 
reflected in the breadth of traditional legislation.
A.  THE AGGLOMERATION OF CURRENT STATE LAW
At what age is a person lawfully al-
lowed to engage in sexual intercourse 
or any of the acts that comprise sexual 
conduct? One of the most troubling 
consequences of current child porn laws 
is the unmitigated criminalization of de-
picting something that is perfectly legal. 
The notion of criminalizing conduct—
and by extension criminalizing the de-
piction of that conduct—is much easier 
to swallow than the dilemma presented 
to sexters. Assuming that a participant 
is doing something legal, the next ques-
tion to consider is how old either or both 
of the participants must be in order to 
lawfully memorialize any explicit sex-
ual image?
1. Specific Applications of the 
Laws Regulating Sexual Expression
There are substantial differences among the states with re-
spect to what age consensual sexual activity is lawful, and there 
is similar variety in the definitions of the age which the subject 
of the image must be to avoid prosecution by one who creates, 
possesses, or distributes the image. When does the creation of a 
sexually explicit image violate the law; when does the transmis-
sion of a sexually explicit image violate one of these laws; and 
when does possession of a sexted image violate the law? These 
are all open questions among the states.
While there are several federal statutes protecting children 
from sexual predators, none impose a minimum age limit on the 
sexual act.23 Rather, the age at which one may lawfully engage 
in sexual conduct24 is controlled by an individual state’s statute. 
Such statutes determine the statutory age over which consensual 
sexual conduct is lawful with anyone who is likewise of legal 
age, with the most common age set at sixteen.25 Eight states 
have set the age at seventeen,26 and twelve states have set the 
age at eighteen.27 At the other end of the spectrum, legislatures 
in nearly every jurisdiction have set age limits at which a child 
is too young to ever consent to engage in sexual conduct.28 A 
sex act with one who has not yet attained this minimum age is 
considered statutory rape.29
Traditional age based limitations on meaningful consent 
have been criticized as intransigent and out of touch with the 
reality of an increase in sexual activity among younger people, 
who are exposed to sex and sex education at earlier ages than 
generations past.30 It is far too simplistic to suggest that adoles-
cents are incapable of making consensual sexual choices in all 
instances. The sexually experienced fifteen-year-old may be far 
more acutely aware of the implications of sexual intercourse 
than her sheltered cousin who is beyond 
the age of consent.31
Understanding the state-by-state 
variations in the age of consent is fur-
ther complicated by a recent trend that 
accommodates a middle group of young 
people who are conditionally allowed 
to engage in consensual sex with oth-
ers who are within a certain range of 
years older or younger than their part-
ner.32 These statutes are often referred 
to as “Romeo and Juliet” laws.33 For 
instance, a number of statutes prohibit 
sex with someone who is more than four 
years younger than the older actor. 34
Every state sets a minimum age 
under which the subject of the image, 
whether referred to as a minor, a child 
or a juvenile, becomes illicit, irrespec-
tive of the degree of explicitness depicted in the image. It is this 
element of the statutes that most directly creates the legal trap 
used to capture sexters.
The great majority of states define this age as being under 
eighteen years of age.35 Three states prohibit possession of im-
ages of those under seventeen,36 and seven set the age at under 
sixteen.37 Delaware alone prohibits imagery depicting anyone 
under eighteen years of age.38 Most states are consistent with 
respect to prohibitions against possessing, creating, and distrib-
uting child porn, but idiosyncrasies are not uncommon.39 The 
legislature in some states made a provision for an affirmative 
defense that the actor can claim he reasonably believed the 
subject of the image was of legal age.40 Typical sexters obvi-
ously know the age of the subject, but it is hardly reasonable 
to think successive possessors or disseminators will give the 
matter any thought.41 The issues become even more complicated 
when interstate digital transmissions are routed through mul-
tiple jurisdictions.
Yet the macédoine is also subjected to the quality or nature 
of the photograph itself. With one exception,42 child pornogra-
It is far too simplistic  
to suggest that 
adolescents are 
incapable of making 
consensual sexual 
choices in all  
instances.
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phy statutes are not conditioned upon a finding of obscenity, 
nor are there requirements of any active sexual conduct. Pas-
sive posing will often be enough to meet child porn prohibi-
tions where the subject is below a certain age, so long as it is 
explicit.43 The typical statute will prohibit the possession, distri-
bution, production or creation of an image of a minor engaged 
in sexual conduct.44 The term sexual conduct is usually defined 
to include easily identified activities such as intercourse or mas-
turbation, but also some rather ambiguous concepts such as nu-
dity,45 or a lewd and lascivious display of genitals.46 Genitals 
are often defined with specificity, right down to the imaginary 
line above the nipple,47 but nudity does not necessarily mean 
without clothes on!48
2. Sex Offender Registration
Sex offender registration requirements exacerbate the 
problem. Since juvenile records are often confidential and will 
not likely expose a teen with a record, the most adverse im-
pact of delinquency adjudication is subjection to the require-
ments of the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification 
Act (“SORNA”),49 whose application varies wildly among the 
states.50 SORNA publicly stigmatizes individuals well past the 
age of majority.
State practice is inconsistent among the jurisdictions with 
respect to who should register, the duration of the registration, 
and the ability of the public to access this information. Thirteen 
states only require registration of juveniles who have been con-
victed as adults for any of the qualifying crimes.51 More states 
require registration for any juvenile adjudicated delinquent for 
the designated offenses, and for the most part these registrations 
are for a period of at least ten years.52 A smaller number of states 
actually allow a judge to make a determination as to whether the 
juvenile should be subject to registration requirements,53 while 
the remaining states have no registration requirements for these 
types of offenses.54 Critics argue that the mandatory nature of 
the laws is over inclusive; that so many offenders are required 
to register that it ironically prevents the public from protecting 
itself against those who pose a real recidivist threat.55 Digital 
technology makes it likely that in the future there will be an 
even greater number of registered offenders, so that the regis-
ters’ efficacy will diminish exponentially for those seeking to 
protect against sex offenders.
The examples at the start of this Article are stark depictions 
of the consequences of the impractical, and sometimes sense-
less, application of traditional child porn statutes to the displays 
of teen sexual behavior, especially when instantaneous dissemi-
nation via modern technology is involved. There is no rational 
basis to effect such disparate treatment of expressions of teen 
sexuality; the sexual thought processes of a sixteen-year-old in 
Iowa are no different than her peer in Virginia.
Four examples of teen behavior introduced in this Article, 
none of which stretch the bounds of credulity. It may surprise the 
reader to know the example that is clearly in violation of state 
law is the most explicable of the group. The sixteen-year-old 
sweethearts, though lawfully permitted to have sex, are prohib-
ited from memorializing it, even to the exclusion of all others.56 
They may also be required to register as sex offenders for a pe-
riod of ten years.57 Assuming there is no claim that intoxication 
vitiated consent, the two seventeen-year-olds from New York 
may lawfully engage in the act, and take a photo,58 but they run 
the risk of prosecution by sending it to Ohio, as does the cousin 
who receives it.59 The young lady from Nebraska and her boy-
friend are saved by a recent amendment to the Nebraska statute 
that presumably was meant to accommodate the issue by includ-
ing affirmative defenses to the traditional child porn statutes.60 
In her case, evidence of the closeness in age, voluntary creation 
of the image, and the limited distribution can be offered as a 
defense to child pornography charges.61 Finally, a condition of 
the statute that requires the photo be possessed or controlled for 
the purpose of arousing or satisfying the sexual desires of the 
person or another person62 will probably leave the consequences 
for our sixteen-year-old Oregonian in the hands of his parents.
III. COMPUTERS, CELL PHONES, AND TEEN USERS
A. IDENTIFICATION OF THE TECHNOLOGY
The primary vehicle of communication referenced in this 
Article is the cell phone which, for all relevant purposes, func-
tions similarly to any computer, though the facts and conclu-
sions herein could apply to all transmissions of the subject 
material, by whatever means developed. Still, the ubiquitous 
cell phone best symbolizes the potential for the creation of ex-
plicit imagery.
Depending upon one’s generation, the introduction to the 
cell phone is associated with Gordon Gekko in the 1980s film 
Wall Street63 or Zach Morris in the 1990s television show Saved 
By The Bell,64 each of whom was armed with the Motorola Dy-
naTAC 8000X.65 The unit weighed two pounds, and was ten 
inches in length, not including the flexible whip antenna, re-
tailed for $3,995, and had a battery life of one hour which re-
quired a ten hour charge to sustain.66
Among teens, age is the most important variable in phone 
ownership. In 2009, about half of those aged twelve to thirteen 
owned cell phones, while surveys claimed seventy-two percent 
owned them by age fourteen.67 Of course, it is difficult to define 
who actually “owns” the device in a typical multi-phone family. 
United States cell phone users sent about 2.1 trillion text mes-
sages in 2010, a nearly fifty percent increase over the previous 
year.68
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B. QUANTIFYING THE CLASS OF AFFECTED YOUNG 
PEOPLE
The first articles about sexting69 reference a survey that was 
of arguably suspect methodology,70 which addressed two very 
important years that most state laws exclude from the legal defi-
nition of a juvenile.71 Unfortunately, most of the early media ac-
counts reported statistics from this poll which concluded nearly 
twenty percent of teens were sending sexually explicit images 
via cell phone.72
Since then, at least three other studies have been con-
ducted,73 finding significantly different (and less) amount of 
sexters.74 The survey that exactly identifies the subject age 
group75 opines that as few as four percent of the sampled popu-
lation engage in the practice.76
A valuable statistic in understanding the breadth of the 
issue would be the calculation of juveniles who have been adju-
dicated delinquent77 for production, distribution, or possession 
of child pornography. The difficulty with obtaining this data is 
two-fold. First, there is the problem of confidentiality of juve-
nile records of such adjudications. Most jurisdictions shield any 
juvenile records from public access, and there is no consensus 
about the nature and degree of sex offenses that are subject to 
reporting under the SORNA.78 Second, not all states require 
youth convicted of certain sex offenses that would fall within 
the subject of this Article to register, and not all registries are 
accessible by the public.79 Further, some of these offenders are 
being held accountable for the harmful and exploitive conduct 
that traditional child pornography laws are meant to punish.80 
To the observer, the statutory violation reads the same.
Since the number of sexters is difficult to pin down, the po-
tential impact of sexting laws on the population of juveniles is 
presumptive in consideration of the sheer volume of cell phone 
users among the age group. When adding computer sexters and 
“Skypers” to the mix, by any measure, there are a substantial 
number of young people impacted by the uncertainty and incon-
sistency inherent in the application of child pornography laws.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT AND  
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
A. INTRODUCTION
When one pictures the average “child pornographer,” one 
does not imagine a seventeen-year-old student body president 
photographing himself after gym class. However, case law 
somehow places the teenage sexter in a jail cell with the very 
people from whom the Court has professed to protect him. The 
camera phone has caused the average fifteen-year-old studying 
for an Algebra quiz, and sneaking a quick suggestive text to her 
beau, to fall unwittingly into the abyss that is child pornogra-
phy. In order to fully appreciate the confusing legal issues that 
surround the teenage sexter, one must understand the frame-
work of pornography law and its evolution.
Before the Court came across the likes of Paul Ferber81 
or Clyde Osborne,82 prosecutions of child pornographers were 
based upon the test for obscenity established in Miller v. Cali-
fornia..83 Explaining that the states have an established interest 
in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene84 material 
when the mode of dissemination carries with it a significant 
danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or 
of exposure to juveniles,85 the Court set out to define the ap-
plicable standard to determine whether material is obscene.86
B. CONCEPTUAL CHILD PORN LAW
1. New York v. Ferber87
In 1982, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether 
the criminality of distributing videos depicting underage chil-
dren engaging in acts of a pornographic nature should be ana-
lyzed under the test for obscenity or under a different standard.88 
Paul Ferber co-owned an adult bookstore and sold two videos 
depicting young boys in various acts of masturbation to under-
cover police officers.89 The state of New York indicted him on 
two counts of promoting an obscene sexual performance and 
two counts of promoting a sexual performance of a child; the 
jury convicted him on both counts of promoting a sexual per-
formance of a child, which did not require proof of obscenity.90
On appeal, a single question was presented: “To prevent 
the abuse of children who are made to engage in sexual conduct 
for commercial purposes, could the New York State legislature, 
consistent with the First Amendment, prohibit the dissemination 
of material which shows children engaged in sexual conduct, 
regardless of whether such material is obscene?”91 Answering 
affirmatively, the Court categorically denied child pornography 
safe harbor within the First Amendment without considerations 
of obscenity.92
Ferber established that even if the images in question are 
not legally obscene, their production and distribution can be 
outlawed because of the state’s interest in preventing child ex-
ploitation and the overwhelming majority of child pornography 
is created in a manner that is an act of despicable child abuse.93 
To fit with the Ferber analysis, this author suggests that a third 
party, perhaps the pedophile that preys on and abuses children, 
must literally be in the background, having had an integral part 
in either its production or dissemination. The opinion clearly 
distinguishes the reasons child pornography is in the special 
class of unprotected speech, as it is proximately linked to the 
criminal act of child abuse.94
Thus, one can conclude that if there is no abuse, if the chil-
dren are not 1) made to engage in the sexual conduct and 2) the 
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materials are not used for commercial purposes, the case is not 
controlled by Ferber. In Ferber, the Court addressed one issue, 
because a single question was presented. The acts occurring in 
the teenage sexter’s photos are not intrinsically related to the 
sexual abuse of children in any of the ways the Court in Ferber 
proffered.95 There is no coercion, exploitation, or abuse, and 
there is no third party behind the camera preying on the sexual 
acts of a child. The scope of this conduct rarely includes the 
sale for money or other commercialization of the images. There 
is no selling, advertising, or promoting of these photographs 
that could implicate the state’s interests as per Ferber. The in-
iquitous motivation that should be required to impose criminal 
liability on the creator is absent. Thus, there is no record of 
child abuse to destroy. Further, the dis-
semination is generally done with the 
foolhardy and youthful indifference for 
modesty and consequence, unlike that 
same teen who flashes a passing car, 
wears a scanty bathing suit, or gets la-
beled with loose morals.
Prophetically, the Ferber Court 
noted that whatever miniscule uncon-
stitutional applications of the statute 
that did occur could be cured through 
case-by-case analysis if the fact situa-
tions to which its sanctions, asserted, 
may not be applied.96 It is essential 
for the Courts to step in and create a 
boundary between Ferber material and 
the sexted image. Consensual and self-
produced images present one applica-
tion that does not conform to the state’s 
compelling interests in protecting chil-
dren from adult predators. The Court, 
arguably, has left room to decide fact 
situations, such as those created by our 
“tech-crazy teens,” which send a significant portion of the 75 
billion texts per month.97
Finally, there is a huge difference between the means of 
production and distribution in 1982 and those means existing 
in 2011. A person who chose to create, format, and distribute 
forbidden material in Ferber’s era would make a far greater 
commitment in time and energy than a similar actor today who 
could take a picture and send it to hundreds of people around the 
world in the time it takes to read this sentence aloud. For these 
reasons, Ferber’s continued relevance can be debated.
2. Osborne v Ohio98
A few years after the Ferber Court found that production 
and dissemination of child pornography was unprotected and 
criminal, the Court was asked to extend the prohibition on child 
pornography to include private possession of these materials.99 
The state of Ohio convicted Clyde Osborne for a violation of its 
Revised Code Section 2907.323, which proscribes possession of 
any material that shows a minor in a state of nudity.100 Specifi-
cally, authorities discovered four photographs, each of a nude 
adolescent male posed in a sexually explicit position.101
Here, the Court held the possession of this material bore a 
causal relationship to criminal conduct similar to Ferber in that 
it created a market or economic motive which was an integral 
part of the production of the child porn.102 It further found the 
statute would serve to destroy the permanent record of abuse, 
which once obliterated could no longer haunt its participants or 
be used by pedophiles to seduce other children into sexual ac-
tivity.103 However, Osborne’s impact on 
the creation of images by minors goes 
well beyond embellishing Ferber. The 
Court approved the State’s construction 
of the term “state of nudity” to include a 
lewd exhibition depicting graphic focus 
on the genitals of the subject.104 This 
construction directly impacts the legal-
ity of erotic photos that could be charac-
terized as nothing more than posing.105 
Every state now includes these graphic 
displays within the statutory definition 
of sexual conduct.106 Often these are the 
non-obscene, yet graphic and highly 
sexual poses and activities that make 
up the high tech flirting that sexting has 
come to represent.107
The Court conceded that on its 
face, the Ohio statute prohibited nude 
depictions of minors, which, standing 
alone constituted protected speech.108 
As construed, however, application of 
the statute exempted from punishment 
actions that were morally innocent, only preventing sinister pos-
session or viewing of the described material for prurient pur-
poses.109 However, in its opinion, the Court did not use the term 
“morally innocent” to describe the protected images, opting in-
stead to state, that by its construction, Ohio chose not to penal-
ize those who view or possess innocuous photographs of naked 
children.110 The majority wrote, “so construed, the statute’s 
proscription is not so broad as to outlaw all depictions of mi-
nors in a state of nudity, but rather only those depictions which 
constitute child pornography.”111 This shows that the Court rec-
ognized, even in 1992, that not all pictures of unclothed minors 
are child pornography.
There are a number of reasons that these images are created, 
that could not be considered as immoral and can rationally be 
classified as artistic, humorous, or legitimate social interaction.
There are a number 
of reasons that these 
images are created, that 
could not be considered 
as immoral and can 
rationally be classified 
as artistic, humorous, 
or legitimate social 
interaction.
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The Court’s language clearly is not an invitation to create a 
new standard to measure these images, but is used as a method 
of distinguishing between that which is categorically child por-
nography and that which is not. This distinction is helpful in 
classifying the voluntarily self-created image as either innocu-
ous and protected, or exploitive and prohibited.
The child pornographer begets a product of no social value 
and his motivations are for no social good. Though the sexted 
image quite often is similar in content to child pornography, it 
is created for completely different reasons and often reflects 
significant social value to its subjects. The self- produced image 
can be sent as an expression of affection, an attempt at humor, 
or a method of social interaction. It can also be appropriate en-
ticement to engage in a relationship or a lawful sexual act. A 
number of surveys attempt to explain the motivations that drive 
young people to this level of exhibitionism.112 In reality, there 
are many circumstances under which minors engage in the pro-
duction and dissemination of sexually explicit images of them-
selves that involves varying levels of coercion and consent. 113 
Efforts to list the reasons teens take nude photos of themselves 
should also likely include “because they can.” It should be no 
surprise that so many teens are unaware they are violating the 
law when they create, possess, or disseminate these images.114
Another decade would pass before the Court again ad-
dressed child pornography legislation; by that time digital im-
agery revolutionized the creation and dissemination of these 
depictions.
3. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition115
In 1996, Congress extended the definition of child pornog-
raphy to include visual depictions, including computer gener-
ated images that were or appeared to be of minors engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct.116 In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coali-
tion, the Court considered whether the government could ex-
tend the child pornography laws to sexually explicit images that 
appear to depict minors but were produced without using any 
real children.117 This could occur in two distinct ways: by using 
adults who look like minors or by using computer imaging.
Fearful of suppression or criminal prosecution, a trade as-
sociation for the adult entertainment industry, the publisher of a 
book focusing on the lifestyle of nudists, a painter of nude art, 
and a photographer who specialized in erotic images challenged 
the statute in Federal District Court.118 On appeal, the question 
presented was whether the federal regulation was constitutional 
where it forbids speech that is neither obscene under Miller nor 
child pornography under Ferber.119
At the outset, the Court declared that the proscribed images 
“do not involve, let alone harm, any children in the production 
process.”120 The indirect harm, Congress asserted, was that a 
child reluctant to engage in on-stage sex acts may be persuaded 
by watching other children who were “having fun.”121 Another 
potential harm discussed was the possibility that pedophiles 
would whet their own sexual appetites and increase creation, 
distribution, sexual abuse and exploitation.122 Both of these ar-
guments are used today to support the continued criminalization 
of the sexted image.123
In a retreat from Ferber and Osborne, the Court held that 
the government could not prohibit speech due to either its ten-
dency to persuade viewers to commit illegal acts, or its utility 
in child enticement because “[t]here are many things innocent 
in themselves . . . such as cartoons, video games, and candy 
that might be used for immoral purposes,” and that “[t]he mere 
tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient 
reason for banning it.”124 The rationale of whetting of sexual 
appetites was similarly dismissed as being of unquantified po-
tential for subsequent criminal acts and not proven.125
Free Speech Coalition explained that the harm Congress 
spoke of flowed from the content of the images, not from the 
means of their production.126 Again referencing Ferber, Justice 
Kennedy reiterated that where the images were themselves the 
product of child abuse, “the state had an interest in stamping it 
out without regard to any judgment about its content.”127 The 
Court applied the Ferber rationale to mean that the produc-
tion of the work, not its content, was the target of the statute, 
and whether it contained serious redeeming value was of no 
consequence.128
Thus, Free Speech Coalition reaffirmed that the First 
Amendment protects speech where the content is neither ob-
scene nor the product of sexual abuse.129 Nothing in this Article 
advocates reviewing standards of obscenity as applied to either 
adults or juveniles. But the Court at least recognizes that images 
of certain acts, even among older adolescents are not necessar-
ily obscene.130 Assuming the legality of the conduct depicted, 
and the lack of abuse in the means of production, self-produced 
imagery is likewise categorized as neither obscene under Miller 
or child pornography under Ferber.
C. RECENT COURT DECISIONS IMPACTING THE 
TRADITIONAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY JURISPRUDENCE
Over the past two terms, the Supreme Court has issued 
opinions in three cases that should influence the course of events 
when juveniles express themselves in sexual matters using 
evolving technologies. Though none of these opinions deal di-
rectly with self-created imagery, they restate that whatever the 
challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing tech-
nology the core First Amendment values of speech and expres-
sion maintain their preeminence and are applicable to minors.
1. United States v. Stevens131
In United States v. Stevens, the Court reiterated the value 
of expression even when the content depicted conduct that 
was unlawful.132 The statute at issue before the Court sought 
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to criminalize the commercial creation, sale, or possession of 
depictions of animal cruelty.133 However, it only prohibited the 
portrayal of harmful acts, not the acts themselves, if the acts 
were unlawful in the jurisdiction in which the portrayal was 
created.134 Although the Court disposed of this case by declar-
ing that the law was overbroad and that a substantial number 
of its applications were unconstitutional judged in relation to 
its plainly legitimate sweep,135 the opinion added value to the 
sexting discussion because it addressed limitations on content 
based censorship. It emphasized the need to link the speech to 
criminal conduct, and also pointed out the problematic enforce-
ment issues from state to state.136
Only recently has the significance of Stevens entered the 
sexting conversation. One author calls the decision possibly 
one of the term’s most doctrinally significant constitutional 
opinions.137 Another flatly argues that after Stevens, the First 
Amendment prohibits the prosecution of minors for sexting 
once they have passed the state’s age of consent to have sex.138 
In fact, by legally permitting minors to have sex in the first 
instance, even prior to Stevens, a state undermines its own ra-
tional bases for criminalizing expression of that sexual activity 
because it is absent a link to any crime. The rationale permit-
ting young people to engage in sex acts while prohibiting them 
from taking pictures of the act creates a distinction without a 
difference.
The Stevens Court repeated the high value to be placed on 
First Amendment protection for the content of images.139 The 
eight to one majority labeled the Government’s claim that a 
class of material be denied First Amendment consideration 
when on balance the value of the speech is outweighed by its 
costs to society as “startling and dangerous.”140 It reaffirmed a 
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment: the Govern-
ment may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because 
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.141
Of greater importance, the Stevens Court directly addressed 
prior child pornography jurisprudence and gave some context to 
the connection between the underlying conduct and the depic-
tion. 142 This intrinsic relationship gives the speech a “proximate 
link to the crime from which it came.”143 The Stevens Court 
reconciles Ferber, Osborne, and Free Speech Coalition to the 
conclusion that the creation of child pornography is a criminal 
act and the depiction thereof is the subject of a previously rec-
ognized and long-standing category of unprotected speech.144 
Absent this connection between the image and the crime, First 
Amendment protection is presumed.145
Intriguing is the concern expressed by the Stevens Court of 
the problematic policy differences among the states as to what 
is lawful or not.146 This was problematic because the relevant 
statute did not prohibit all portrayals of animals being injured 
or killed, but only those pictures created in states where the 
method of inflicting the injury was itself unlawful.147 Likewise 
discordant child porn laws create bizarre legal results for juve-
niles who produce or disseminate images among the states.148 
This occurs in the self-creation of cyber-porn when material 
created lawfully in State A is transmitted by one click to State 
B where the same photo is banned as child pornography, such 
as in the New York party example given early on in this Article. 
The weight of such dicta cannot be minimized when consider-
ing the substantial differences among the states as to who is 
regulated and what conduct is proscribed in sexual expression 
among young people.
The Court recognized that expression is not static, and it 
indicated a willingness to consider other categories of speech 
in relation to the Amendment’s protection, once they are identi-
fied.149 The Court has not had the opportunity to address images 
created with the ubiquitous cell phone and the digital technol-
ogy available today. Importantly, this evolution undermines the 
method of production rationale upon which Ferber is based. 
Though this calculus could change in the aftermarket, at least at 
its inception, when young people voluntarily and consensually 
produce imagery of lawful conduct, there is no victim and there 
is no crime. This is the premise upon which a solution to the 
problem, discussed in Part VI, is based.
Since the Court has made room for the exclusion of, as yet 
unidentified, categories of speech from First Amendment pro-
tection, there is equal reason to believe it will make room for 
the inclusion of a subset of expression that was previously cat-
egorically banned.150 After all, the Court has also shown some 
sensitivity to the emerging behavior of those who choose to 
utilize these gadgets to supplement or replace how they com-
municate.151 As the rapidly developing methods of producing 
these images has evolved, so too has the expressive behavior 
of the end users.
2. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association152
When California attempted to regulate the sale and rental of 
violent video games to people under eighteen,153 its statute was 
struck down by two lower federal courts,154 and the Supreme 
Court affirmed in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Associa-
tion.155 The Court’s Brown decision indicates the direction the 
Court will take when considering whether the lawful, voluntary, 
and consensual expressions of children are intrinsic to crimi-
nal child pornography, and therefore unprotected. In Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion, the Court noted California’s attempt 
to create a new category of content-based regulation that is 
permissible only for speech directed at children;156 calling the 
effort “unprecedented and mistaken,” the Court reiterated the 
significant measure of First Amendment protection accorded 
to minors subject only to the state’s compelling interests and a 
statute’s narrowly drawn restrictions.157 Arguably, video game 
technology and cell phone applications have evolved on a simi-
lar track over the past twenty years.158
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Brown underscores Stevens’ importance by declaring it as 
the controlling authority for its decision.159 The Court recog-
nized that “[l]ike the protected books, plays, and movies that 
preceded them, video games communicate ideas [and social 
messages] . . . and that suffices to confer First Amendment pro-
tection.”160 There is no previously recognized and long-standing 
category of unprotected speech associated with violence and 
“the basic principles of freedom of speech . . . do not vary” with 
a new and different communication medium.161 In short, while 
a State may protect children from harm, that does not confer 
unbound power to restrict the speech to which children may be 
exposed.162
Unfortunately, some will probably latch on to Brown as 
authority that a state merely needs to show how expression of an 
idea harms children to regulate the content of that speech. Yet, 
the Court did not hold that proof of a causal link between violent 
video games and minors’ aggressive be-
havior would satisfy the strict scrutiny 
a content-based restriction requires; it 
acknowledged that it is a good place to 
start the inquiry.163 However, in Brown, 
the Court flatly declared that Califor-
nia could not show such a direct causal 
link between violent video games and 
harm to minors.164 Thus, an argument 
that speech is harmful to minors is not 
persuasive, as it prevents the Court from 
recognizing a new “well-defined and 
narrowly limited class of speech.”165
It is axiomatic that every aspect of 
traditional child pornography is harm-
ful, but the same cannot be attributed 
to the consensual creation of pornog-
raphy by all minors. The State must 
specifically identify an actual problem 
in need of solving and the curtailment 
of speech must be actually necessary to 
the solution.166 The values of the First 
Amendment are impugned when the real reason for governmen-
tal proscription is the idea expressed, rather than its objective 
effects.167
Minors are entitled to a significant measure of First Amend-
ment protection in matters of expression, even if a legislature 
thinks the subject is inappropriate or unsuitable for them.168 The 
section below on current legislative responses is illustrative of 
what other conduct or actions will engage new statutory prohi-
bitions, or will satisfy current regulations. These most probably 
will include age grouping, surreptitious recording, and inten-
tion to harm.169 Looking forward, the idea that having sex is 
acceptable, yet memorializing it is not, will be a tough sell for 
legislators in trying to identify the problem, and will prove it 
causes harm to the welfare of minors. Something more than a 
generic claim that the conduct involves child pornography will 
be required before sexters should be subjected to traditional 
child porn laws.
The potential to create pornographic images has been avail-
able since the 1820s when the first permanent image was burned 
on heliograph.170 Now, the ability to disseminate an image 
around the world at the push of a button—easily, inadvertently, 
and uncontrollably—has outgrown Ferber’s legacy.
3. City of Ontario v. Quon171
Though Stevens and Brown are relevant to the premise of 
this Article as First Amendment cases, another recent opin-
ion, unmentioned in any of the literature on sexting, requires 
acknowledgement. In Ontario v. Quon, the Supreme Court 
unanimously ruled that a reasonable search of an employer 
provided telephone to discern whether 
employees were inadvertently being 
required to pay out-of-pocket for busi-
ness expenses did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.172 At first blush, one may 
ask how this Fourth Amendment claim 
is relevant to this topic, but the devil is 
in the details.
While the Court kept its ruling 
narrow and cautioned that these issues 
must be decided on a case-by-case 
basis, it acknowledged that “[r]apid 
changes in the dynamics of communi-
cation and information transmission are 
evident not just in the technology itself 
but in what society accepts as proper 
behavior.”173 Of particular importance, 
the Court noted that “cell phone and text 
message communications are so perva-
sive that some persons may consider 
them to be essential means or necessary 
instruments for self-expression, even 
self-identification.”174
Not unexpectedly, Justice Scalia expressed skepticism that 
“[a]ny rule that requires evaluating whether a given gadget is 
a ‘necessary instrument for self-expression, even self-identi-
fication,’ on top of assessing the degree to which the ‘law’s 
treatment of [workplace norms has] has evolve[d],’ is (to put it 
mildly) unlikely to yield objective answers.”175
This language adds substance to the argument that in these 
transmissions, the content or use of the innovation is not as im-
portant as the change in interpersonal dynamics the innovation 
brings with it. Cell phones and other technology empower teen-
agers to assert their independence from adults. These advances 
have been referred to as the “technology of the self.”176
Cell phones and other 
technology empower 
teenagers to assert  
their independence 
from adults. These 
advances have been 
referred to as the 
“technology of  
the self.”
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We have traveled this path before. Television had an im-
pact on society that birthed a body of scholarship devoted to the 
proposition that “the medium is the message.”177
V. HARM: THE DISPUTATION ASSOCIATED  
WITH SEXTING
No one can claim the Government lacks compelling mo-
tivation to regulate the creation of child porn because of the 
harms of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation. Yet a body of 
work attempts to dislodge self-created images from the category 
of child pornography because the creation is consensual, non-
exploitative, and absent of any sui generis risk of physical harm 
in their creation.178
This discourse is driven by the complete lack of agreement 
as to the nature and extent of the harm to the children in the 
means of production of the images.179 The traditionalist theory 
asserts that child pornography is harmful and thus not protected 
by the First Amendment; that sexting is child pornography, 
and therefore sexting is harmful and not protected by the First 
Amendment.180 This Article rejects that theory.
A. HARM: THE CONNECTION TO FERBER
Few of us would risk disapprobation by suggesting that 
sexting by minors is a good thing. But the ongoing debate seems 
to characterize harm based on paternalistic, perhaps even re-
ligious, ideas that explicit display of the human body equates 
with the harm sought to be repelled by the states and for which 
the Supreme Court has created an exception to First Amend-
ment protections.181
While attempting to compare and equate differing concepts 
of harm, some authors seem to ignore that Ferber is directed to 
the context within which the image is produced, not the con-
tent, of the image.182 That case does not permit suppression 
of speech merely because it is harmful, it does so because the 
speech is a criminal act. As Brown points out, determination of 
a causal relation between the idea expressed and some harmful 
consequence is a good place to begin the discussion of the gov-
ernment’s right to regulate the content of speech. 183 Professor 
Leary and others contend that once the images are created they 
produce “vast” social harm since they are used by offenders 
to sexually assault children; they aid in the creation of juve-
nile sex offenders; and they further support the sexualization 
and eroticization of children.184 Leary notes a study that found 
nearly a quarter of juvenile sexual abuse cases, the abuser used 
pornography to groom, legitimize, and demonstrate for the vic-
tim what to do.185
Likewise Professor Calvert adds to the list of the injuries 
and harms from sexting: mental anguish in the form of embar-
rassment and humiliation when the images are disseminated 
without consent; harassment from others in the form of bul-
lying; economic harm in the form of possible job loss or in-
ability to obtain employment when the images are discovered; 
parental punishment; criminal punishment; in school punish-
ment; and social stigma.186 Noticeably absent from both authors 
is any reference to the relationship between sexting and the 
harms inherent in the invasion that accompanies the creation of 
the photo in an actual case of child pornography. This damage 
certainly includes physical, mental, and emotional trauma oc-
curring while the image is being made. Likewise missing is any 
acknowledgement that the sexted image is often created for a 
valid, if immature, reason.
Authors have also latched onto the harm associated with 
traditional child porn creation in that it creates a permanent re-
cord of the abuse of the child, which the states rightfully have 
a compelling interest to eradicate.187 The future of any image 
disseminated is out of control of the subject, and when the sub-
ject had no say in its creation, or the image is the product of 
abuse, the permanent record argument is justified. But when the 
subject image contains imagery that was made knowingly and 
voluntarily by young people of lawful age to engage in the act 
or conduct, this argument loses persuasiveness. In these circum-
stances, the lessons learned from self-created explicit images 
are the equivalent to an imprudently placed tattoo.
B. HARM: DISCONNECTING FROM FERBER
There is pushback from authors where sexted photos are 
often labeled child pornography by prosecutors while bearing 
little resemblance to traditional notions of child pornography.188 
Many of the harms chronicled are also associated with other 
events in a juvenile’s life. As one author states,
Without the underlying criminal and coercive methods 
of production, the circulation of self-produced images 
does not subject the minor to the same type of con-
tinued invasion and exploitation of his or her sexual 
autonomy and bodily integrity that is so degrading that 
it can only be characterized as a continuation of the act 
of sexual abuse.189
Nowhere in the news or the literature do we find physical 
trauma or serial sexual exploitation associated in the creation of 
the sexted image. “Although such images surely hold unlimited 
potential for subsequent harm if disseminated without the mi-
nor’s consent, or even if the minor merely regrets having vol-
untarily distributed such images in the future, this harm is not 
identical or even substantially similar to the harm suffered by 
victims of child pornography.”190 Civil law provides remedies 
by way of money damages and restraining orders to provide 
relief to one who makes the image possible, yet who later feels 
aggrieved when she feels it is improperly used.191
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The far-reaching effects of being registered as a sex of-
fender arguably outweigh the embarrassment associated with 
the possession and dissemination of self-taken pornographic ma-
terials.192 Employers routinely use the Internet for background 
checks and are likely to discover a candidate’s sexual offense 
history;193 the chance of personal identification by means of an 
indiscreet image in cyberspace is more random. Far from being 
forced or enticed into submitting to sexual acts to be recorded 
in some fashion, with self-produced child pornography, it is the 
minor who decides to create or distribute sexually explicit im-
ages.194 Who cannot look back to some regrettable conduct as 
an epiphany that changed their view of personal responsibility 
for their actions?
The claim that these images aid in the creation of juvenile 
sex offenders is only true because we choose to label the con-
duct for juveniles. Assuming the offensive photos were taken 
by, and of, a consenting pair of sixteen-year-olds, how do the 
circumstances surrounding the act make it more criminal than 
the circumstances of similar images contained in any main-
stream, health and reproduction guide?195
Much has been said of the tragedy of the young woman in 
Ohio, who some claim took her own life in a tragic response to 
the publication of explicit photos she took for and sent to her 
then boyfriend.196 Arguably, it was the consequence of her in-
ability to handle the shame at the revelation of a most intimate 
set of images combined with the abject cruelty at the hands of 
her peers. It is quite a stretch to say her death was the direct 
harm caused by sexting. The blame should not be so much on 
the images as it should be on others’ reactions to them as a more 
direct harm to her. Little discussion about the complexities of 
teen suicide accompanies this tragic event.
Bullying is certainly a problem that can cause harm and it 
has been the subject of national attention.197 The solution is to 
regulate the conduct of the bully, however, not the content of the 
message. Understandably, the Internet has expanded the reach 
of the bully. Enforcement of existing laws against menacing and 
other forms of harassment is the more logical route to holding 
them accountable within the criminal justice system.
The lack of consensus on the quantity, nature, and degree 
of harm created in the production or dissemination of depictions 
of lawful conduct should devalue its weight in the discussion. 
In Brown, the Court did not hesitate to reject the conventional 
wisdom that exposure to violent video games causes harm to 
minors.198 There is hardly a consensus as to how creating and 
sending explicit self-created images correlates to children, or if 
it harms them at all.
C. HARM: SEXUALIZATION OF CHILDREN
The sexualization of children is a concept that, as any par-
ent knows, is as frustrating as it is unavoidable in our culture. 
Whereas Professors Leary, Calvert, and others declare sexual-
ization to be a constituent part of the harm child porn laws is 
meant to nullify, this Article distinguishes the harm caused by 
the child pornographer from the harm associated with the sexu-
alization of children.
The child pornographer causes physical, mental, and emo-
tional damage through exploitation and abuse of a vulnerable 
population, and his is an affliction borne of malady or malevo-
lence. Sexualization may not cause any ill effect, and more im-
portantly, it exists with the complicity of parents and friends; 
it is an inescapable component of our environment, a rite of 
passage that nearly all teens face. Even if they are somehow 
victimized it can hardly be compared with the acts of a pervert 
or pedophile. Of equal interest is the degree that sexualization of 
the young has impacted the jurisprudence of child pornography. 
As discussed below, we have gone to great lengths and strayed 
far from Ferber in order to prove that the images are categori-
cally child pornography.199
1. Societal Acceptance of Teen Sexuality
The intersections of the adolescent brain, our oversexed 
society, and digital communication have created an accident 
looking for a place to happen. The American Psychological As-
sociation found, “[v]irtually every media form studied provides 
ample evidence of the sexualization [of women], including tele-
vision, music videos, music lyrics, movies, magazines, sports 
media, video games, the Internet, and advertising.”200 The scope 
of digital technology creates a new level of control, enabling 
even the most immature computer users access to unfiltered im-
agery and the ability to pass it on instantaneously and globally.
Findings in studies have shown “ that women more often 
than men are portrayed in a sexual manner (e.g., dressed in re-
vealing clothing, with bodily postures or facial expressions that 
imply sexual readiness) and are objectified (e.g., used as a deco-
rative object or as body parts rather than a whole person).”201 
Additionally, “a narrow (and unrealistic) standard of physical 
beauty is heavily emphasized . . . [and] these are the models of 
femininity presented for young girls to study and emulate.”202 
Though the volumes on female sexuality obliterate the dearth of 
literature on the sexualization of boys and young men, the mes-
sage is equally clear that a person’s value comes only from his 
or her sexual appeal or sexual behavior, and a person is held to 
a standard that equates physical attractiveness with being sexy. 
“[A] person becomes sexually objectified—that is, made into a 
thing for others’ sexual use, rather than seen as a person with 
the capacity for independent action and decision making [and] 
sexuality is inappropriately imposed upon a [child].”203
One need look no further than the musical craze of “boy 
and girl bands,” and the likes of plainly sexualized children such 
as Miley Cyrus, Justin Bieber, and Jaden Smith for examples 
of this social trend. Only recently, Abercrombie & Fitch drew 
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attention when it advertised the sale of padded bikini bras for 
children under the age of ten.204
According to Judith Levine, author of Harmful to Minors: 
The Perils of Protecting Children from Sex:
[W]e have arrived at a global capitalist economy that, 
despite all our tsk-tsking, finds sex exceedingly mar-
ketable and in which children and teens served as both 
sexual commodities (JonBenét Ramsey, Thai child 
prostitutes) and consumers of sexual commodities 
(Barbie dolls, Britney Spears).205
It seems hypocritical that adults permit access to maga-
zines, movies, and cable television, web cams, computers, and 
cell phones and yet are unwilling to take some responsibility for 
the impact it has on children.
VI. A METHOD TO RECONSTRUCT CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY LAWS
As described below, a number of states are actually incor-
porating statutory language that will separate the “morally inno-
cent” and “innocuous” imagery from the perverse and harmful 
kind. Whether these laws have been effective in preventing the 
creation and dissemination of this imagery is beyond the focus 
of this Article, which is directed to the constitutionality of cur-
rent child pornography laws once 
the image is discovered. The prac-
tical enforcement of these laws 
has been made exponentially more 
difficult because of digital tech-
nology. On the other hand, once 
discovered, these images leave 
an electronic trail that often pro-
vides a prosecutor with irrefutable 
evidence as to their production and 
dissemination.
The ability to articulate cir-
cumstances that will determine 
what conduct is legal and what 
is not is at the root of American 
lawmaking. One authority, the 
prosecutor, is best suited to en-
gage these statutes, not only on a 
policy level, but in the determina-
tion that the evidence is sufficient 
to meet the elements of these new 
and hopefully improved statutes. The conventional child por-
nography laws cover a great deal of expression that is routine 
for today’s youth and bears little resemblance contextually to 
the material in Ferber and Osborne.
A. CURRENT LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO REGULATE 
SEXUALLY EXPLICIT IMAGES
Along with the conclusion that juveniles require different 
treatment for their criminal activities is the concession that juve-
niles are “more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences 
and outside pressure,”206 and “[o]nly a relatively small portion 
of adolescents who experiment in risky or illegal activities de-
velop entrenched patterns of problem behavior that persist into 
adulthood.”207 The central importance of these factors is the un-
derlying assumption of the juvenile court movement. A major 
influence in public opinion on sexting was law enforcement’s 
response to the conduct. The response was to use existing child 
pornography law to formally prosecute juveniles and register 
them as sex offenders for periods that went well beyond their 
majority.208
No one gets elected to legislative office by promising to be 
soft on crime. Paradoxically, by a recent count, more than half 
of state legislatures have endeavored to amend their child porn 
statutes to decriminalize or recriminalize sexting so as to reduce 
the level of offense, the punishment for the conduct, and even 
the formality of instituting criminal charges or sex offender 
registration requirements.209 Additionally the media and law 
enforcement have gone to lengths to warn children that, under 
present conditions, sexting can only lead to disaster.210
The provisions of legislation proposed or enacted indicate 
there is still no consensus as to any particular policy concern, but 
the new statutes attempt to accom-
modate a number of issues—all di-
rected to mitigating the perceived 
harshness of using traditional child 
porn law. Most new laws attempt 
to mitigate the legal consequences 
for the juvenile’s ribald manner of 
expression. Some new regulation 
takes a front-end approach and in-
cludes: subjecting the juvenile to 
counseling, community service, 
and life skills training;211 requiring 
school districts to disseminate on 
the dangers of distributing sexu-
ally explicit images via the cell 
phone; requiring point of sale in-
formational brochures when a cell 
phone is purchased; and creating 
diversion programs for offend-
ers.212 To the extent these statutes 
are directed toward prohibiting the 
use of digital technology that is integral to criminal conduct, 
they will be within the reach of Supreme Court boundaries on 
the limit to free speech. To the extent the statutes criminalize 
It seems hypocritical that 
adults permit access to 
magazines, movies, and 
cable television, web cams, 
computers, and cell phones 
and yet are unwilling to take 
some responsibility for the 
impact it has on children.
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the depiction of lawful conduct, they too will lose relevance and 
enforceability. The lack of progress toward a unified legislative 
solution suggests judicial intervention is necessary to identify 
the class of cases that do not constitutionally qualify for pros-
ecution as child pornography.213
B. PROPER PURPOSES LANGUAGE
Among the reasons the Ohio statute was validated in Os-
borne was the state court’s interpretation of “state of nudity” 
that created an exception to the reach of the law where the cre-
ation and possession of the images was morally innocent.214 
Thus, one can conclude, the only conduct prohibited by the stat-
ute is conduct that is not morally innocent, i.e., the possession or 
viewing of the described material for prurient purposes.215 This 
language decriminalizes photos taken by parents of their naked 
babies in a bathtub, though literally the creation and possession 
of these images violates the statute.
To that end new statutes, or amendments to existing stat-
utes, have carved out criteria where the creation, possession, 
or dissemination is not for prurient purposes, is not coerced or 
exploitive, or commercialized, and thus is outside the ambit 
of Ferber and Osborne. These enactments might not be art-
fully worded but certainly they are headed in the right direc-
tion. Judicial construction obviously will impact their efficacy 
and constitutionality. One common thread appears to be found 
in the addition of language to the statutory prohibitions that 
clearly intends to accommodate actions that are consequences 
of youthful indiscretion rather than perverse exploitation or 
some other criminal act.216 They create exceptions to traditional 
proscriptions that track pattern behavior common to sexting and 
Skyping.
For example, one statute, typically, declares it unlawful to 
knowingly possess a visual depiction of sexually explicit con-
duct, wherein the subject is a minor.217 If the possessor is over 
nineteen years of age, the violation is a Class III Felony, and if 
under nineteen years of age, a Class IV Felony.218 However, it 
then goes on to state:
(3) It shall be an affirmative defense to a charge made 
pursuant to this section that:
(a) The visual depiction portrays no person other than 
the defendant; or
(b)
(i)  The defendant was less than nineteen years of 
age;
(ii)  the visual depiction of sexually explicit con-
duct portrays a child who is
fifteen years of age or older;
(iii)  the visual depiction was knowingly and 
voluntarily generated by the child depicted 
therein;
(iv)  the visual depiction was knowingly and vol-
untarily provided by the child depicted in the 
visual depiction;
(v)  the visual depiction contains only one child;
(vi)  the defendant has not provided or made avail-
able the visual depiction to another person ex-
cept the child depicted who originally sent the 
visual depiction to the defendant; and
(vii)  the defendant did not coerce the child in the 
visual depiction to either create or send the 
visual depiction.219
This statute now protects the intended and lustful expression 
of the fifteen-year-old Nebraska woman and her boyfriend de-
scribed in the beginning of this paper.
North Dakota prohibits the surreptitious creation and 
possession of an image without written consent from each 
individual depicted in the image as well as the publication or 
distribution of the sexually explicit image with the intent to 
cause emotional harm or humiliation.220 It further makes it an 
offense to publish the image, electronically or otherwise, after 
the individual depicted in the image, or the parent or guardian 
of that individual, expressly notifies the actor that they do not 
give consent to having the image disseminated.221 Thus, under 
this statute, though the underage sexters may assent to the cre-
ation and distribution of the image initially, a parent or guardian 
can revoke that consent and further transmission will become 
unlawful.222 This statute cleverly covers covert methods to ob-
tain the images from unsuspecting subjects’ public displays of 
sexual conduct at parties and sleepovers.223
If proper purposes can be articulated to rescue sexters from 
punishment, then it follows that legislators can include improper 
purposes for which a juvenile sexter can be sanctioned. Thus, 
interdiction has been directed toward the malevolent use of the 
imagery in the form of increasing the level of crime to a felony 
offense for those who post the image with the intent to harm or 
injure the reputation of the subject.224 One of the most outra-
geous misuses of sexted images occurred among teens in Wis-
consin and resulted in extortion charges and a significant jail 
sentence for the offender.225 Of questionable validity is the Lou-
isiana statute, exempting passive posing, but not active conduct, 
from the statute’s reach.226 On the one hand, Osborne authorizes 
prohibitions of passive posing when the statute’s construction 
encompasses the graphic focus on the genitalia, and on the other 
sexual activity between the subjects might be completely lawful 
and thus meriting the same legal treatment as posing.227
C. CIRCUMSTANCES INTEGRAL TO CRIMINALITY
To date, approximately half of the states have made ef-
forts to redefine the boundaries between criminal behavior and 
behavior which many feel is merely inappropriate for young 
people.228 There are a number of ways to accommodate the 
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legitimate reach of criminal prohibition without contradicting 
core First Amendment values. One example is the use of tra-
ditional statutes, which are available to prosecute the creation 
and transmission of self-created pornography when the circum-
stances involve conduct that has traditionally been subject to 
statutory regulation.
In some states, recently enacted or pending legislation cen-
ters on the use of the explicit images to harass,229 to stalk,230 to 
harm the reputation of another,231 or with the intent to cause 
emotional harm.232 Likewise, existing prohibitions against ex-
tortion and blackmail create consequences for the unlawful use 
of these depictions.233 These types of offenses existed before 
technology so pervasively altered communication. Addition-
ally, artfully worded statutes can be enacted to regulate or ban 
surreptitious creation or the commercial use of these images. 
Statutes can be enacted that prohibit enticement for sexual pur-
poses where the age difference vitiates any reasonable claim of 
consent by both parties, as well as the use of the depictions to 
entice another into an unlawful act.234
Statutes require scienter, and a list of descriptive words, or 
“operative verbs” that clearly describe a proscribed course of 
conduct that sanctions speech that accompanies it. As used in 
the statute, they must be surrounded by other words of the stat-
ute so as to define the determinative fact that must be proven. 
This fact often will be the intention of the actor and, though it 
may be difficult to prove, the statute’s requirements are clear 
questions of fact. It may be dif ficult in some cases to determine 
whether the requirements have been met, but courts and juries 
every day pass upon the reasonable import of a defendant’s 
statements and upon “knowledge, belief and intent.”235
D. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
One of the boundaries suggested here is a judicially cre-
ated standard of whether the image was lawfully created at the 
time and in the jurisdiction of its origin. If the image depicts 
conduct that is lawful, then possession or transmission of the 
image would be lawful, unless that possession or dissemina-
tion was integral to an articulated criminal act. The prosecution 
would have the burden of proving the image was not lawfully 
created, and the alleged delinquent could escape liability by 
asserting the affirmative defense of its legitimacy. Subsequent 
to that determination, the prosecution would be required to al-
lege and prove that the creation, possession, or distribution of 
the image was integral to other criminal conduct. This requires 
statutory language that identifies the prohibited conduct and the 
remaining determinations of questions of fact that are clearly 
inherent to the adjudicatory process and the subjects of juries’ 
deliberations every day.
This result carves out a sanctuary for a significant amount 
of speech that does not create the risk of harm that is unforesee-
able to the creator of the image. As distasteful as adults might 
find this prospect, it has the important consequence of impos-
ing self-responsibility upon those who would create these cir-
cumstances. Conversely, if the creation or consumption of the 
material is inherent to criminal conduct, there is also a legal 
consequence. “Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor 
subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be sup-
pressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a 
legislative body thinks unsuitable to them.”236
Most of the discussion in the literature has addressed the 
policy decision of whether or not to prosecute under generic 
statutory prohibitions, and there have been few efforts to pro-
pose what charges should be brought against minors who self-
create sexually explicit material.237 The most obvious remedy 
would be to add a mens rea element to the existing statutes238 
—but that is easier said than done. Articulating the fact(s) which 
must be proven to show knowledge and a subjective belief the 
materials are child pornography will run a substantial risk of 
over-inclusion as per the analysis in Brown.239
Professor Calvert identified distinctions between primary 
and secondary sexting.240 Any further or secondary dissemina-
tion would be a violation of the law.241 This approach is not 
feasible for two reasons. First, there would need to be consensus 
as to whom (what age) would be subject to the statute, requiring 
acceptance by all fifty states and territories of a Uniform Act.242 
Additionally, analogous to Brown, some young people—as well 
as their parents—may not object to the further distribution of 
these “glamour” shots, especially if they are lawfully created 
at the inception.
A third proposal distinguishes between traditional child 
pornography and juvenile pornography.243 If the subject is a 
minor, and the image was created and disseminated exclusively 
to minors, the offense would not be taken as seriously as if it 
involved an adult somewhere in the process.244 This method of 
decreasing the gravity of and penalty for the offense underlies 
most of the current legislative activity regarding sexting in the 
United States.245 This effort does not solve the problem, but 
merely renames it. It also does not take into account that one of 
the actors may be an adult, but only days or weeks older than 
his protégé.246 Ultimately, the issue to be addressed will be the 
criminalization of depicting conduct which is lawful. It is no 
less lawful by changing it from a felony to a misdemeanor or to 
a status offense.247
Regardless of whether these new or amended statutes lower 
the seriousness of the crime and consequences of a violation, or 
whether they provide for defenses to the violation itself, clearly 
they address the perceived injustice in the prosecution of sex-
ting under generic child pornography statutes. Legislatures are 
slowly moving in the right direction, but without consensus on 
issues—such as at what age to regulate and what conduct to 
separate from traditional notions of child pornography—tech-
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nology will increase the gap between existing laws and evolving 
teen behavior.
E. THE PROSECUTOR’S ROLE SHOULD BE EXCLUSIVE
It is essential that legislation aimed at protecting children 
from allegedly harmful expression, no less than legislation 
enacted with respect to adults, be clearly drawn and that the 
standards adopted be reasonably precise so that those who are 
governed by the law and those that administer it will under-
stand its meaning and application.248 Since someone in authority 
must initiate the process, the suggestion here is that the process 
should begin with a review by law enforcement generally, with 
the ultimate responsibility falling on the prosecutor to deter-
mine whether formal charging is supported by legally sufficient 
evidence.249
Currently, many states utilize juvenile intake officers to 
screen complaints and make determi-
nations as to whether a delinquent act 
was committed. They make decisions 
that are fundamental to initiating for-
mal proceedings in Juvenile Court, 
and routinely with no oversight by the 
prosecutor. This is in conformance with 
the philosophy of the Juvenile Court 
system, but it is misplaced when con-
sidering legal accountability for the 
possession, creation, and dissemination 
of sexually explicit images. Often these 
people are not trained as lawyers, and 
though they are quite skilled in screen-
ing most crimes, the nuanced legislation 
initially requires legal analysis of facts 
from the perspective of both the law en-
forcement and the accused.250 In some 
states the young person who takes the 
photo of herself is subject to a higher 
degree of charges than the senders and 
receivers of the photo, even if it is then 
distributed to hundreds of others.251 The charging process re-
quires early determination as to whether the facts constitute 
prima facie evidence that a delinquent act was committed by 
the accused juvenile.252 The character and quality of the image 
will be assessed to determine whether the image is categorically 
child pornography. Evidence of the subjective belief of the actor 
in creating or possessing the image will be determined. The re-
lationship among the young people who created, possessed, and 
distributed the images will engage any statutory affirmative de-
fenses. Issues of coercion, exploitation, or commercialization 
must be considered in a consistent manner that is integral to any 
criminal activity prosecution. This type of legal analysis is com-
mon, but too few other crimes are charged in the regular course 
of the prosecutor’s business.253
The prosecutor should have the exclusive right to screen 
facts obtained from law enforcement and other sources to de-
termine whether those facts are legally sufficient for prosecu-
tion.254 If it is determined that the facts are legally sufficient, the 
prosecutor should make the decision as to what route the mat-
ter will travel through the juvenile justice system.255 Ultimately 
there will be one authority, accountable to the community, who 
will make consistent decisions that contain a legally and factu-
ally sufficient basis upon which to proceed. This procedure has 
a beneficial impact upon the prosecutor as it provides him or 
her with an explanation to an irate parent as to why there will 
be no criminal action initiated when the facts do not support 
any charges arising out of the lawful and voluntary image their 
daughter has created. Likewise, the pub-
lic will be protected from a subjective 
personal judgment by a prosecutor that 
an image is immoral or inappropriate.
Recently the Third Circuit con-
sidered and granted a restraining order 
against a criminal prosecution that has 
drawn much comment in the literature 
on sexting and the First Amendment.256 
Plaintiffs’ daughter was depicted in 
a photo, taken two years earlier when 
she was thirteen, which depicted her 
and another from the “waist up wearing 
white, opaque bras.”257 Another Plain-
tiff’s daughter was shown wrapped in 
a white, opaque towel, just below her 
breasts, appearing as if she had just 
emerged from the shower.258 In addition 
to the usual list of prohibited sexual acts, 
the Pennsylvania statute also banned the 
“lewd exhibition of genitals or nudity if 
such nudity is depicted for the purpose 
of sexual stimulation or gratification of 
any person who might view such depiction.”259 The prosecutor 
felt he had a basis for threatening these charges because, in his 
view, the images were “provocative.”260
Among the suggestions offered by Professor Leary in her 
original article is a protocol for prosecutors to utilize in deter-
mining the best course of action in deciding whether to prose-
cute sexters or not.261 However, the idea expressed in this Article 
is not on the discretion of the prosecutor to bring charges, but 
rather the constitutional sufficiency of the charges brought.262 It 
should satisfy those who believe the government has either the 
right or the duty263 to intervene when children engage in fool-
ish conduct that arguably causes them harm. Given the lack of 
capacity universally associated with adolescence, it is important 
Ultimately there will 
be one authority, 
accountable to the 
community, who 
will make consistent 
decisions that contain 
a legally and factually 
sufficient basis upon 
which to proceed.
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to address whether the goals264 of criminal or juvenile justice 
are satisfied by the formal prosecution and sexual registration 
of sexters.
VII. CONCLUSION
This discussion is not merely an academic exercise. Recent 
census data shows there are roughly forty million people in the 
United States between the ages of twelve and seventeen.265 Sur-
vey data show millions of those within this age group access 
computers, webcams, cell phones, and smart phones. There is 
no reason to expect our highly sexualized teen culture to reverse 
course either technologically or in matters of personal propriety. 
We have established arbitrary cut-off points, determined solely 
by chronological age, to establish criminal liability among them, 
while on the other hand we acknowledge irresponsible behavior 
is “virtually a normative characteristic of adolescent develop-
ment…and that adolescents are overrepresented statistically in 
virtually every category of reckless behavior.”266
The Supreme Court has never clearly defined “child por-
nography” and has not disturbed state statutes that regulate 
any and every aspect associated with minors and sexual activ-
ity or nudity. Clearly though, it has created the legal author-
ity for states to legislate upon their compelling interests. For 
reasons expressed in this Article, ambiguity in the definitions 
of those interests is blocking a consensus on the conduct which 
can be regulated. We continue to rely on chronological age to 
regulate the propriety of sexual expression. Sexting, Webcam-
ming, Flickr, Facebook, Skyping, FaceTime and their counter-
parts have enabled a form of expression that bears little relation 
to the subject of Ferber and Osborn. The Supreme Court has 
clearly identified sexual abuse and child exploitation as evils to 
be targeted, while also indicating that room needs to be made 
for imagery that does not fall within these malevolent purposes. 
In this tug of war, the army of juveniles and the sophistication of 
their weaponry have nullified traditional rules of engagement.
It is plain that a blanket thrown over all aspects of juvenile 
nudity or sexual hijinks covers too much ground, and laws that 
generically ban explicit images of randomly aged people are 
going to collide with both First Amendment speech and Fifth 
Amendment Due Process claims. Efforts to overlay constitu-
tional doctrine from Ferber and Osborne are out of sync with 
the methods and motives of expression among the young in 
2011. This has resulted in the operation of an internally inco-
herent system of child pornography laws.267
Some sexting is not consensual; it is coerced and exploit-
ative, and requires a societal response through the juvenile or 
adult justice system. A number of states have attempted to 
specify circumstances when even the consensual creation and 
transfer of the imagery is unacceptable because it is integral 
to criminal activity. Sexual registration should still be consid-
ered after judicial evaluation, though in general the laws have 
come under great criticism, particularly as they have impacted 
juveniles. Some research shows that these laws have no impact 
on sex offenders or their crimes.268 Other statutes consider a 
number of factors in the creation of the photos to accommodate 
legitimate forms of expression where the participants and the 
images are innocent of any real and harmful threat to the safety 
of children. This Article suggests one metric to be the legal-
ity of the conduct depicted. Initially, a statute should clearly 
distinguish lawful conduct from unlawful conduct. Thus, as-
suming the image is not obscene, it is not child pornography if 
it is created by or between people of lawful age to engage in the 
conduct it depicts. Subjective legal assessments are pernicious 
and have resulted in criminal charges such as those notoriously 
brought in Pennsylvania only because a prosecutor decided the 
images were “provocative.”269 Subjective measures of harm are 
distracting rhetoric likewise leading nowhere.
Is sexting empowering or exploitative? When reasonable 
people can differ as to whether it is exploitative, and it is unclear 
as to who is being manipulated, entry into the criminal justice 
process hardly seems productive in light of the current penalties. 
This is especially true when considering the public branding 
result, which lasts well beyond the act giving rise to the of-
fense. Child pornography laws were created to combat perverse 
exploitation and abuse of children by adults.
Though a number of distinguished authors have weighed in 
on policy considerations, such factors are not central to this Ar-
ticle. This Article addresses the issue of what to prosecute, not 
when to prosecute. The focus has been on the need to articulate 
specific prohibitions, identifying an incriminating behavior that 
allows the prosecutor, rather than a judicial officer, to decide 
whether the case presents credible evidence of all the elements 
that constitute the offense.
It is truly ironic that a jurisprudence that has affirmed the 
social value of unrestrained communication about depictions of 
gross or unlawful subject matter is criminalizing the commu-
nication of depictions of lawful matter. Given the numbers of 
juvenile sexters there seems to be “something profoundly amiss 
when a system of laws makes serious felony offenders of such 
a large proportion of its young people.”270
Though few could have predicted the phenomena of sexual 
Skyping or sexting, existing jurisprudence inadequately identi-
fies who is to be protected and from what action protection is 
needed. If these methods of expression create matters of com-
pelling state interest then they need to be identified and articu-
lated in statutes that combat the harm caused, protect the public 
interest, and accommodate the special status of juvenile offend-
ers who are likely to be rehabilitated. The Prosecuting Attorney 
is in the best position to administer these laws at the policy level 
and in the courtroom.
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